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LETTER DATED 29 APRIL 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Osman Ertuğ, representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

I should be grateful if the text of that letter and its enclosure, which contains a letter dated 25 April 1994 sent to you by H.E. Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Inal BATU
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 29 April 1994 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a self-explanatory letter dated 25 April 1994, addressed to you by H.E. Mr. Rauf R. Denktaş, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Enclosure

Letter dated 25 April 1994 from Mr. Rauf Denktas
to the Secretary-General

Further to your report of 4 April 1994 (S/1994/380), I wish to share with you some of my views and evaluation regarding the latest developments in the proximity talks aimed at building confidence between the two sides in Cyprus.

Before giving you my views and evaluation, I wish to reconfirm that we fully support your mission of good offices and are sincerely committed to cooperating with you and your representatives in your efforts to seek a resolution in Cyprus that requires the equal participation of the two communities and must be decided upon by and be acceptable to both sides (see S/21393).

From the outset, the Turkish Cypriot side has been advancing the view that the deep crisis of confidence between the two sides is the main cause for the absence of progress in your efforts towards achieving a fair, realistic and viable overall settlement. As I expressed earlier, it is with this conviction that the Turkish Cypriot side has shared and supported your accurate analysis reflected in your report of 19 November 1992 (S/23830, para. 63) that:

> "It appears from the recent joint meetings that there exists a deep crisis of confidence between the two sides. It is difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails."

It was on the basis of the above analysis that the confidence-building package was introduced with the rationale that prospects for progress would be greatly enhanced if a number of confidence-building measures were adopted by each side and a new climate of confidence created to advance the goal of concluding a mutually acceptable overall settlement.

The main assumption in this new initiative was that the provision of real, tangible, considerable, proportionate and balanced benefits would contribute towards the creation of a new climate of confidence between the two sides. With this in mind, the package of confidence-building measures developed by you summarized the benefits to accrue to the two communities as follows:

> "For the Turkish Cypriot side, it would mean the lifting for all practical purposes of the economic obstacles that have been weighing so heavily on their community, especially as regards overseas travel and trade, and the development of a significant tourist industry. For the Greek Cypriot side, it would open the way for owners of property in the fenced area of Varosha to reclaim possession of their property and start using it again" (S/26026, para. 47).

The package comprised 14 specific measures.

You will recall that, both during the preparatory phase in Nicosia during April-May 1993 and subsequently at the joint meetings held in New York under

your auspices, the Turkish Cypriot side had proposed that, in return for the handing over of the fenced area of Varosha to United Nations administration, the existing embargo on the Turkish Cypriot side be lifted. In this context we had specifically insisted that the prevailing embargo on Ercan airport and seaports in Northern Cyprus be lifted as a matter of priority.

In spite of the above position, in order to contribute towards reaching an agreement on the confidence-building measures package, we displayed our good-will by not insisting on the complete lifting of the embargo on our airport and ports and by agreeing merely to the easing of economic obstacles on the travel, trade and tourism of Turkish Cypriots through the reopening of Nicosia International Airport under United Nations administration. In so doing, we relied on the assurance given to us by the United Nations that the benefits that would accrue to the Turkish Cypriot side by the reopening of Nicosia International Airport under United Nations administration would be the same as those which would accrue if the embargo on Ercan airport had been lifted. Subsequently, this assurance was recorded in your report of 1 July 1993 as follows:

> "... Once again, the proposed arrangements were adjusted, with the agreement of Mr. Clerides ... (b) to overcome existing economic obstacles and provide the Turkish Cypriot side the same benefits at Nicosia International Airport that they wished to have at Ercan airport through a provision that would open Nicosia International Airport to Turkish-registered airlines" (S/26026, para. 26).

This assurance emanated from the basic objective and benefit that:

> "... The United Nations would none the less try very hard to secure agreement on a package, the practical effect of which would be to lift most of the commercial obstacles encountered by the Turkish Cypriot side" (ibid., para. 13).

The provisions of the confidence-building measures package were brought to the attention of the world community by paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of, and annex I to, your report of 1 July 1993. I am sure you share my conviction that the guiding considerations of the confidence-building measures package are at least as important as the contents of the package itself. The main guiding considerations, which the Turkish Cypriot side has taken into account while formulating its views, understandings and position in regard to the confidence-building measures package and which are contained in your various reports and correspondence, are as follows:

(a) Given the purpose of confidence-building measures, it is inevitable that neither side seek any political advantage or require the other side to make political concessions in this context (ibid., para 13 and the agreement entitled "Arrangements for working out the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures" dated 15 February 1994 (S/1994/262, annex II));

(b) The benefits to accrue to each side would have to be significant in practical terms, but neither side should be asked to adopt measures that would

require it, directly or indirectly, to change its position on the political status of the other (S/26026, para. 13);

(c) The reopening of Nicosia International Airport in the manner set out above (i.e. in the manner as set out in paragraph 43 of your report of 1 July 1993) would have a profound impact on the economic situation of the Turkish Cypriot community. It would provide a direct link with the economies of other countries. The Turkish Cypriot community would be able to export products and produce direct to overseas markets and to import in a similar manner. In addition, the way would be open for it to attract a significant direct flow of foreign tourists to the northern part of the island. It would also enable Turkish Cypriots to travel overseas unhindered, direct from Nicosia (ibid., para. 44);

(d) The content of the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of your report will be faithfully adhered to (your letters of 17 December 1993 (S/1994/262, annex I) and 3 February 1994 and the agreement entitled "Arrangements for working out the modalities for implementing the package of confidence-building measures", dated 15 February 1994;

(e) There is ample scope for the two leaders to agree on a schedule for implementing the package that will bring real and tangible benefits to both sides at each stage (S/26026, para. 27);

(f) Arrangements will need to be agreed to enable Turkish Cypriots to travel overseas unhindered, direct from Nicosia. This represents a key benefit of the package for the Turkish Cypriot community, and an agreement for implementing the package is difficult to envisage without there being agreed arrangements in this regard (S/1994/262, para. 31);

(g) Your appeal to both leaders to accept in principle the package of confidence-building measures as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of your report of 1 July 1993 on the understanding that its provisions will be fully implemented (see S/1994/262, annex I);

(h) The benefits would be relatively greater for the Turkish Cypriot side because of the relative size of its economy and their impact in alleviating the serious obstacles currently confronting the Turkish Cypriot economy (see ibid.).

The progress made during the joint meetings held in New York in May 1993 was duly reported and set out as the confidence-building measures package in your report of 1 July 1993. At the conclusion of the New York joint meetings, it appears that you were convinced that the Greek Cypriot leader had accepted the confidence-building measures package. This was reflected in your reports as follows:

> "... The discussions from 24 May to 1 June revealed that the Greek Cypriot side was agreeable to the arrangements proposed for Varosha and Nicosia International Airport" (S/26026, para. 19).

"... It was agreed that Nicosia International Airport would be open to foreign airlines, and that airlines registered in the Republic of Turkey would enjoy the same rights" (ibid., para. 23).

"... Mr. Clerides reaffirmed that the Greek Cypriot side was agreeable to the provisions proposed for Varosha and Nicosia International Airport" (S/26438, para. 9).

I evaluated your letter of 17 December 1993 requesting the leaders of both communities to accept in principle the package of confidence-building measures as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of your report of 1 July 1993 (on the basis of (a) the understandings, considerations and guiding principles which you expressed regarding the package; (b) the reports of the international team of experts that you sent to Cyprus; and (c) your statement that Mr. G. Clerides had accepted the package. In doing so I took as a tangible safeguard your understanding that the provisions of the package would be fully implemented. Consequently, I informed you with my letters of 20 and 28 January 1994 that the Turkish Cypriot side had accepted, in principle, the package set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of your report of 1 July 1993.

As you are well aware, we have long-established positions concerning some specific provisions of the confidence-building measures package. The main one of these is our position concerning the area north of Dhimokratias Street in the fenced area of Varosha, which we have consistently maintained since 1978. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the statements and encouragement made particularly by you, your representatives and third parties that there would be no question of adding to or subtracting from the contents of the package and that the contents of the package should be wholly accepted, I decided to show maximum flexibility. In order to secure the necessary political support for the confidence-building measures package in Parliament, I particularly emphasized statements made by United Nations authorities to the effect that there would be no additions to or subtractions from the package. I explained to my people on the basis of your reports why international direct flights to and from Ercan Airport had not been included in the package and how the benefits that the Turkish Cypriot side wished to enjoy at Ercan airport would be enjoyed at Nicosia International Airport. Taking into account the statements of United Nations authorities and the reports of the international team of experts, I promised to my people that there would be separate satellite terminals at Nicosia International Airport where customs and immigration formalities would be conducted. Furthermore, I elaborated the understanding that there would be equal benefits at every stage of the implementation of the provisions of the package.

In your letter of 3 February 1994, you urged us to respect four basic considerations. One of these considerations was, as I mentioned above, that the content of the package set out in my report of 1 July 1993 should be faithfully adhered to. Bearing in mind the above-mentioned basic considerations, you had encouraged us, in your letter, to pursue intensive discussions in Nicosia with your representatives, beginning in mid-February, to work out an agreement on the limited number of key issues relating to the modalities for implementing the confidence-building measures package. I again wish to repeat here that, in all the contacts that I had with your representatives, I faithfully adhered to all

the basic considerations you had asked us to respect. Moreover, the basic consideration that the content of the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package as set out in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 will be faithfully adhered to was actually incorporated into the agreement reached on 15 February 1994 (S/1994/262, annex II).

The confidence-building measures package as contained in paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of, and annex I to, your report of 1 July 1993 was endorsed by the Security Council and your effort to bring about an agreement was supported. The Security Council, in its letters of 7 July (S/26050) and 20 September 1993 (S/26475) demonstrated its support for the package. Furthermore, the Security Council, by its resolutions 889 (1993) of 15 December 1993 and 902 (1994) of 11 March 1994 has openly declared its support for the package contained in your report of 1 July 1993. In its resolution 902 (1994) the Security Council expressed its pleasure with the acceptance of the said package in principle by the two sides.

In your report of 4 March 1994, you stated that your representatives "... can now bring forward, in regard to each of the main issues in the agreed agenda, ideas that ought to enable the two leaders to reach common understandings on the implementation of the package" (ibid., para. 34). This procedure was welcomed by the Security Council in paragraph 3 of its resolution 902 (1994) of 11 March 1994).

In the course of the "proximity talks" in Cyprus, your representatives on 9 and 21 March 1994 put forward to the two sides some ideas regarding the key issues on the agenda that were marked "Strictly confidential" and that were headed "Draft ideas for the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures". Our understanding is that these ideas would help the two leaders to bring about a mutually agreed draft agreement. This understanding is confirmed in your report of 4 March 1994 where you state that "... it should be possible for my Representatives, in line with the agreement reached on 15 February, to put forward ideas on each of the seven issues with a view to helping the two leaders to reach a formal agreement on the package quickly" (para. 16).

We have established that in the ideas presented to us there are fundamental departures from some basic issues of the confidence-building measures package as set out in your report of 1 July 1993 that we had accepted in principle. We brought this critical development to the attention of your representatives. We, therefore, requested your representatives to continue their contacts with the two sides in order to ensure that the content of the "ideas" conformed with the letter and spirit of the confidence-building measures package as set out in your report of 1 July 1993 and with the considerations that formed the basis of the package. The reply that was given to me was to the effect that the ideas, as contained in the "non-paper" of 21 March 1994, cannot be changed and that unless we accepted those ideas the matter would be reported to the Security Council! I thus learned that the strictly confidential ideas presented to us by your representatives, supposedly with a view to helping us to reach a formal agreement on the package, were in fact draft agreements and not "non-papers" for our consideration.

The Turkish Cypriots side sincerely desires the implementation of measures that will contribute towards the building of mutual confidence between the two sides in Cyprus and is eager to continue to participate constructively in all efforts aimed at this objective.

I fully appreciate that the objective of the work we started with your representatives on 15 February 1994 was to identify the modalities for the implementation of the confidence-building measures package as set out in your report of 1 July 1993. I also appreciate that a text that aims at detailing modalities for implementation has to be more comprehensive as compared with the confidence-building measures text set out in your report. However, I am sure you will agree with me that any such text should include all the basic elements of paragraphs 37, 38, 42 and 43 of your report of 1 July 1993 and at the same time comply with the considerations on which the package is based.

The points to which you state in your report of 4 April 1994 (S/1994/380) that I had objected in fact either relate to elements that are different from those contained in your report of 1 July 1993 or are points that do not comply with the considerations on which the package is based. There are four such main points and I give below our views on each of them:

1. Schedule for the implementation of the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport package, especially regarding the timing of benefits to the Turkish Cypriot side

The balanced benefits to accrue to the two sides, as established by the confidence-building measures package, emanate from two sources: the fenced area of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport. There is a close linkage between these two sources of benefits and it is for this reason that the confidence-building measures package is often referred to as the "Varosha and Nicosia International Airport package". This point is confirmed in your reports, where it is pointed out that the tangible benefits accruing to the Greek Cypriot side are derived from Varosha and those accruing to the Turkish Cypriots are predominantly derived from Nicosia International Airport. Paragraphs 44 and 47 of your report of 1 July 1993, to which I have referred above, specifically highlight this point.

You rightly point out in paragraph 27 of your report of 4 March 1994 that "... there is ample scope for the two leaders to agree on a schedule for implementing the package that will bring real and tangible benefits to both sides at each stage".

Nevertheless, the schedule that is envisaged in the ideas for the implementation of the package does not permit the realization of the above guideline. Bearing in mind the Varosha/Nicosia International Airport linkage, the suggested schedule would not have satisfied the critical material and psychological benefits that would have accrued to the Turkish Cypriot side by the reopening of Nicosia International Airport, at the time when the large area south of Dhimokratias Street of the fenced area of Varosha will have been opened for Greek Cypriot rehabilitation, thus facilitating the satisfaction of critical material and psychological benefits through the reclaiming of possession of

properties. As you are aware, the United Nations experts estimate that it will take a minimum of 12 to 18 months for Nicosia International Airport to be operational.

As I have pointed out above, in your report of 4 March 1994 (S/1994/262, para. 31), you had emphasized that the arrangements that would enable Turkish Cypriots to travel overseas unhindered and direct from Nicosia International Airport represented a key benefit of the package and this is how I presented the matter to my people. Let alone the violation of your synchronization guideline referred to above, I sincerely believe that you will appreciate that it would not be politically possible for me to tell my people and to find convincing arguments that we would be able to benefit from Nicosia International Airport only at least 10 months after the transfer of the fenced area of Varosha to the United Nations administration and at least 8 months after the opening of the larger part of the fenced area of Varosha to the south of Dhimokratias Street to Greek Cypriot rehabilitation.

I appeal to you to help us to ensure the upholding of your guiding consideration that the package will bring real and tangible benefits to both sides at each stage (ibid., para. 27).

2. Arrangements concerning traffic rights at Nicosia International Airport

You had asked us to accept in principle the following provision of the confidence-building measures package as set out in paragraph 43 of your report of 1 July 1993, which you indicated that Mr. G. Clerides had accepted in New York back in May 1993:

> "Traffic rights at the airport would be limited to foreign airlines that have traffic rights in Cyprus. Such rights would be enjoyed by airlines registered in the Republic of Turkey."

In paragraph 23 of your report of 1 July 1993 you confirmed that Mr. G. Clerides had accepted this provision.

Notwithstanding this, the said provision has been changed at the request of Mr. G. Clerides, without our consent, in the ideas as presented to us by your representatives on 9 and 21 March 1994.

Although the original text of this provision did not by design envisage the use of Nicosia International Airport by "Cyprus Airways", the present form of the ideas, by the deletion of the word "foreign", has been altered to enable the Greek Cypriot national carrier (Cyprus Airways) to use Nicosia International Airport. We do not and cannot accept this one-sided change. Our objection is not the result of mere emotional reaction. This change upsets the delicate internal balances of the package and is contrary to the basic philosophy, considerations and objectives of the whole exercise.

As you know, Nicosia International Airport is being reopened under United Nations administration as a "key benefit" to enable Turkish Cypriots to travel

overseas unhindered and direct because they have not been able to use Ercan for direct international flights hitherto. The same restriction, however, does not apply to the Greek Cypriot Larnaca airport. As such, the use of Nicosia International Airport by the Greek Cypriots cannot be seen as being part of the benefits envisaged within the context of the basic philosophy and objectives of the confidence-building measures exercise. Mr. G. Clerides, for political reasons and considerations, caused changes to be made to this provision of the package, which he had earlier accepted. This kind of approach is not compatible with the guiding considerations of the confidence-building measures package. On the other hand, Cyprus Airways, as a "national carrier", would take advantage of the privileged but unwarranted international status of the Greek Cypriot administration and would be able to use Nicosia International Airport under more advantageous terms as compared with the Turkish Republic-registered "Cyprus Turkish Airlines". Thus, under the guise of lifting economic obstacles on the Turkish Cypriot community, this change, in a subtle way, would amount to the extension of the jurisdiction of the Greek Cypriot administration to the now United Nations-controlled (and if the package is implemented United Nations-administered) Nicosia International Airport. You will appreciate that such a change is not compatible with the content, basic considerations and objectives of the confidence-building measures package, which was mutually accepted in principle by both sides.

Moreover, there are no restrictions in the provisions of the confidence-building measures package set out in your report of 1 July 1994 as regards the number of airlines registered in Turkey that would be able to use Nicosia International Airport. The attempt in the United Nations ideas to limit the number of Turkish-registered airlines entitled to enjoy traffic rights at Nicosia International Airport to "an agreed number" amounts to a substantive reduction of the benefits envisaged for the Turkish Cypriot community in the package.

A further change made in the ideas, which amounts to a further reduction of our agreed benefits, is that "the [United Nations temporary administration's] airport administrator will have authority to negotiate traffic rights for a Turkish Cypriot airline between Nicosia International Airport and overseas destinations". This provision is contrary to paragraphs 26 and 44 of your report of 1 July 1993, where there is no restriction on Turkish-registered airlines that will fly direct to overseas destinations.

The above-mentioned changes to the package clearly constitute a reduction in the "key benefits" specifically earmarked in the package for the Turkish Cypriot side.

3. Collection by the United Nations of customs duties in Varosha and Nicosia International Airport

The inclusion of customs duties in the jurisdiction of the United Nations administrators of Varosha and Nicosia International Airport is a surprise addition to the package, which has political and economic implications for the Turkish Cypriot community. The fact that customs formalities will be conducted by the two sides is confirmed in the reports of the international team of

experts, which envisage that the two sides will have satellite terminals at their respective entrances to Nicosia International Airport, where necessary immigration and customs formalities will be carried out (the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) report of December 1993, executive summary para. 3, and paras. 4.1.2, 4.3.4 and 5.2).

4. Arrangements concerning travel between the United Nations-controlled buffer zone and the fenced area of Varosha

The following provision is made in your report of 1 July 1993 concerning travel between the United Nations-controlled buffer zone and the fenced area of Varosha (para. 38, fourth item):

> "Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be able to enter the Area freely and without any formality".

The Turkish Cypriot side is prepared to take the necessary measures to comply with this provision and ensure that travel between the United Nations-controlled buffer zone and the fenced area of Varosha shall be free and without any formality. On 28 March 1994, to demonstrate the good will of the Turkish Cypriot side further, we presented your representatives in Cyprus with talking points, outlining free, secure and unhindered travel between the fenced area of Varosha and the United Nations-controlled buffer zone (see attachment). This outline even included an observation capacity for the United Nations, a constructive improvement that was not envisaged in the confidence-building measures package as set out in your report of 1 July 1993.

In the ideas presented to us on 21 March 1994, your representatives envisaged mandatory "unmanning procedures" in the area belonging to the Turkish Cypriot side between the southern perimeter of the fenced area of Varosha and the United Nations-controlled buffer zone. This concept and arrangement are not envisaged in the confidence-building measures package that you had asked us to accept in principle. Such an arrangement would result in Turkish Cypriot territory, comparable in size to the fenced area of Varosha itself, being taken out of the effective control and usage of the Turkish Cypriot side in addition to the fenced area. This is something that we cannot accept.

In addition to the above-mentioned four deviations from the package, as you no doubt know by now, the map given to us in Nicosia by your Deputy Special Representative, Mr. G. Feissel, on 19 May 1993 in respect to the fenced area of Varosha is different from the recent United Nations map presented to us on 11 March 1994 and, especially, the south-eastern boundary of this last map is significantly different from the actual closed and fenced area of Varosha that is the subject-matter of the package. All these deviations and additions make it extremely difficult for me to convince myself, my people and Parliament that we are talking about the package that I accepted with my letters of 20 and 28 January 1994.

I feel confident that you appreciate the legitimate concerns that I have outlined above and the need to adhere faithfully to the content and guiding

considerations of the confidence-building measures package. It is only then that we would have fulfilled the promises we made to our people on the basis of the confidence-building measures package that was set out in your report of 1 July 1993 and that we accepted in principle after lengthy public discussions in our community and Parliament.

In the above spirit I welcome the appeal in your report of 4 April 1994 to the two sides and others to continue high-level contacts in pursuit of an agreement.

I wish to reiterate the determination of the Turkish Cypriot side to adhere faithfully to the confidence-building measures package as set out in your report of 1 July 1993 and to continue to cooperate positively and constructively with your representatives with the objective of reaching a mutually acceptable agreement.

It is my expectation that in this phase of the proximity talks the distorted balance of "benefits and risks", which has come about through no fault of the Turkish Cypriot side, will be restored and that both sides will adhere faithfully to the content and the underlying guiding principles of the package to which both sides have agreed in principle.

I am confident you will give due consideration to the facts and considerations that I have brought to your kind attention and to the appeal that I make in this letter.

(Signed) Rauf R. DENKTAŞ
President

Attachment

Talking points dated 28 March 1994

Paragraph 38, item 4, of the report of the Secretary-General of 1 July 1993 (S/26026) provides that "Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be able to enter the [fenced] Area [of Varosha] freely and without any formality". In the discussions leading to the identification of the key issues for the implementation of the confidence-building measures package, the Turkish Cypriot side displayed its good will by agreeing to the addition in the first key issue of the additional words "secure travel to and from the fenced area" (15 February 1994). Notwithstanding these specific provisions the United Nations non-papers of 9 and 21 March 1994 venture outside the parameters of the confidence-building measures package and introduce a new dimension envisaging the placing of an area completely outside the fenced area of Varosha (the road between the southern perimeter of the fenced area of Varosha and the United Nations-controlled buffer zone) under United Nations protection.

The placing of the passage between the southern perimeter of the fenced area of Varosha and the United Nations-controlled buffer zone under United Nations protection would in essence be contrary to the repeated assurances given by the Secretary-General and his representatives to the Turkish Cypriot side both in Nicosia and in New York.

The Turkish Cypriot side, bearing in mind the content of the package and the repeated assurances given by the Secretary-General and his representatives, in its desire to be positive, constructive and cooperative, has proposed that:

(a) The Turkish Cypriot side undertakes to ensure that Greek Cypriots will be able to enter and leave the fenced area of Varosha freely and without any formality and in an unhindered and secure manner;

(b) The point of entry on the existing road from the United Nations-controlled buffer zone leading to the fenced area of Varosha will be manned with Turkish Cypriot civilian police to ensure free, unhindered and secure travel;

(c) No formality whatsoever will be applied while entering or leaving the said point of entry (or exit);

(d) The United Nations will have an observation capacity from its observation post in the United Nations-controlled buffer zone of activities at the Turkish Cypriot point of entry (exit);

(e) United Nations personnel travelling between the southern perimeter of the fenced area of Varosha and the United Nations-controlled buffer zone will also be able to observe free, unhindered and secure travel along the said road;

(f) The Turkish Cypriot side commits itself to take appropriate action that may be necessary to improve further the sense of security of Greek Cypriots travelling to and from the fenced area of Varosha.

Considering that (a) in the "Arrangements for working out the modalities for the implementation of the package of confidence-building measures" (S/1994/262, annex II), both sides have undertaken to adhere faithfully to the content of the confidence-building measures package; (b) United Nations administrators will be submitting six-monthly reports on the implementation of the confidence-building measures agreement to the Secretary-General; and (c) there is a benefits and risks balance in the package elaborately worked out by the Secretary-General, the Turkish Cypriot side is convinced that the above arrangements to provide free and unhindered travel to Greek Cypriots to and from the fenced area of Varosha fully conform to the letter and spirit of the confidence-building measures package as set out by the Secretary-General in his report of 1 July 1993 to the Security Council.